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Large scale land acquisitions by 
foreign investors in Africa for 
agricultural purposes continue to 
capture attention worldwide. In 
recent years Namibia has received 
some proposals from multi-national 
agricultural corporations to develop 
large scale irrigation projects, 
mainly in Namibia’s water rich 
north-eastern regions However, to 
date none of these proposed large 
scale projects have materialised. 
In 2010 two proposed large scale 
agricultural projects in the north-
eastern communal areas of Namibia 
did not come to fruition. Plans to 
develop a 10 000ha commercial 
crop production farm within the 
Bwabwata National Park were 
dropped after an environmental 
assessment showed that it was not 
feasible for the developer, Demeter, 
to continue with the project. 
The second project, a 10 000ha 
sugarcane development by PGBI 
Engineers & Constructors (Pty) LTD 
in the Eastern Caprivi did also not 
materialise after what seemed to 
have been a confrontation between 
two traditional authorities over 
the land to be allocated to PGBI. 
But while foreign investors might 
not have been making headway 
in acquiring land in Namibia’s 
communal areas, another form of 
‘land grabbing’, driven by politically 
well-connected locals, is taking 
place. The occupiers of all the 
exclusive farms are typically wealthy 
people with significant local status. 
Many are civil servants, political 
figures or self-made businessmen 
who derive most of their income 
from non-farming activities. They 
seldom live on their farms and 
few have received any training in 
agriculture. In short, these are new 
farms owned by a new generation 
of entrepreneurs pursuing business 
enterprises new to communal land 
(Mendelsohn et al 2006).
This brief examines some emerging 
trends and dynamics in changing 
power relations in rural Namibian 
communities due to emerging new 
elites and the threats to subsistence 
farmers’ access to communal land 
and natural resources.
A history of contested 
land ownership
Namibia became a German 
Protectorate in 1884. The German 
colonial administration negotiated 
several land purchases and 
protection treaties with local leaders 
to give the German government 
and German companies the rights 
to use land. Many European settlers 
bought or leased Namibian land 
for commercial farming, thereby 
formally defining the areas occupied 
by indigenous communities. By 
1902, freehold farmland accounted 
for 6% of Namibia’s total land 
service area while 30% was formally 
recognised as communal land. 
After the 1904–1907 war between 
Germany and forces of the Herero 
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and Nama, large tracts of land were 
confiscated from the Herero and 
Nama by proclamation. By 1911, 21% 
of the total land service area had 
been allocated as freehold farmland 
while the recognised communal 
land area had shrunk to just 9% 
(Mendelsohn 2003).
With the end of German colonial rule 
in 1915, South West Africa became a 
Protectorate of Great Britain, with 
the British King’s mandate held by 
South Africa in terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles signed in 1919. Under 
the Treaty and the South West 
Africa Act 49 of 1919, land held by 
the German colonial administration 
effectively became Crown (or State) 
land of South West Africa. The 
Governor-General of the Union 
of South Africa had the power to 
legislate on all matters, including 
land allocation (Adams et al 1990). 
Starting in the 1920s, the South 
African Administration granted 
generous loans to white farmers 
to build dams, drill bore¬holes and 
buy livestock and gave them expert 
advice, back-up services, drought 
relief and regular access to the 
already subsidised South African 
mar¬ket¬ing system. By contrast, 
almost nothing was spent on black 
farmers living in native reserves at 
the time (UNIN 1988).
With apartheid policies already func-
tioning in South Africa, in 1962 Prime 
Minister HF Verwoerd appointed 
the Odendaal Commission to advise 
the South African Government on 
how to introduce a similar policy of 
separate development in South West 
Africa (RSA 1978). As a result in 1964, 
ten reserves (homelands) for black 
people were established in South 
West Africa, as proclaimed in the 
Development of Self-Government 
for Native Nations in South West 
Africa Act 54 of 1968, which recog-
nised Owamboland, Hereroland, 
Kaokoland, Okavangoland, Dama-
raland and Eastern Caprivi as ‘native 
nations’. The Act was purportedly 
introduced to help ‘native nations’ 
develop in an orderly way to attain 
self-governance and independence 
(Namlex 2004).
The Representative Authorities 
Proclamation 8 of 1980 (AG 8) es-
tablished ‘second-tier’ government 
for eleven ethnic groups, each with 
an executive and legislative body 
empowered to issue ordinances in 
its area of jurisdiction. AG 8 made 
Representative Authorities trustees 
of homeland land, but the South 
African-based central government 
still owned the land. AG 8 gave Rep-
resentative Authorities the power 
to allocate, sell or lease communal 
land under their jurisdiction to a 
specific ethnic group, provided that 
the South African Cabinet issued 
a certificate confirming that such 
land was not required for public or 
official purposes. AG 8 prevailed 
in Namibia until 1990 when it was 
repealed and replaced by the Con-
stitution of the Republic of Namibia.
Land use and the law 
before independence
Colonial legislation made few 
inroads into traditional power 
to allocate land. In most areas, 
traditional leaders were still 
responsible for allocating land.
In contrast to colonial claims, chiefs 
and headmen were not owners, but 
merely acted as high-level managers 
of communal land. Secondly, a 
distinction between private land 
and communal land exists under 
customary law, so a plot consisting 
of a homestead (kraal) and fields, 
allocated by a chief or headman 
to the head of the homestead, 
could be seen as private property 
since the person occupying it had 
lifetime tenure. On the other 
hand, communal areas, including 
communal grazing areas, hunting 
and gathering grounds outside 
inhabited areas, were accessible to 
all residents of Ovamboland. Field 
managers managed communal 
land, channelled access, coordinated 
maintenance and guarded against 
overexploitation.
Many present-day traditional au-
thorities are not aware of any pre-
independence statutory legislation 
on land allocation. The colonial 
government entrusted them to 
enforce customary laws and the 
area was self-governing.  Headmen 
and Chiefs normally had the power 
to allocate land and would show 
an individual the boundaries of his 
plot (normally 4–6ha depending 
on family size); no written records 
were kept of land allocations, but 
people respected their boundaries 
and village headmen knew their 
villages well and could show who 
owned what — knowledge that was 
passed on through oral tradition. 
People (usually married men) 
received small plots of land for culti-
vation, but not for grazing, typically 
paying a head of cattle in exchange 
for land. If a person did not have 
cattle, he might do a favour for the 
Traditional Authority, such as col-
lecting firewood. A widow might 
make a basket for the Traditional 
Authority in lieu of payment. If an 
individual was a member of the 
Traditional Authority, he would be 
given a plot of land for free, so he 
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could be located centrally. A person 
was typically granted land after he 
was married through a traditional 
wedding ceremony. Women or 
children were not given land, but 
people from outside the area could 
be allocated land. Grazing land was 
communally shared.
Under customary law, commer-
cial farms were not allowed on 
communal land, but there were no 
other restrictions on land allocation, 
although an individual never had 
more than one plot of land.
Land reform after 
independence
At the time of independence in 
1990, the unequal distribution of 
agricultural land and high rates of 
unemployment drew the attention 
of the newly elected government to 
land redistribution. But on the land 
question, the government found 
itself caught between two opposing 
parties: white farmers argued that 
the redistribution of commercial 
farms to resettle communal farmers 
would have a devastating effect on 
the economy and environment and 
would cause massive unemployment 
among black farmworkers, but 
black communal farmers increasing-
ly demanded that they obtain com-
mercial farms to relieve pressure on 
grazing land in communal areas. 
Arguably, since independence, 
the Namibian land reform process 
has focused more on reforming 
freehold land than on reforming 
communal land, as evidenced by 
parliament passing the Agricultural 
Commercial Land Reform Act 
in 1995, but only passing the 
Communal Land Reform Act in 2002 
after a lengthy process in which 
various drafts exchanged hands in 
parliament, the National Council 
and the Council for Traditional 
Leaders for comment (according to 
a member of the Law Reform and 
Development Committee, about 
nine drafts of the bill were circulated 
during twelve years of preparation). 
During the decade-long negotiation 
process, the lack of constitutional 
recognition of customary land 
tenure rights in communal areas 
resulted in communal farmers and 
traditional authorities having no 
statutory law remedy to defend 
their rights. Powerful interest 
groups often used this policy and 
administrative vacuum to their 
advantage and ignored customary 
land tenure rights when they fenced 
off large tracts of communal land 
(Cox et al 1998).
Given Namibia’s pre-independence 
policy history of racial segregation 
and restricting movement, article 
21(g) of the Namibian Constitution 
sought to guarantee freedom of 
movement in Namibia, while article 
21(h) creates the right to reside and 
settle anywhere in the country, 
implying that land use policy and 
plans may not inhibit Namibians 
from moving, settling and acquiring 
land in any part of the country, but 
it clearly does not confer a right to 
settle on the land of others. 
Article 16 of the Constitution 
and the Agricultural Commercial 
Land Reform Act of 1995 commits 
the government to guarantee 
the right of all persons to own 
private property and to pay just 
compensation for all land acquired. 
No similar provision exists under 
the Communal Land Reform Act of 
2002. The Communal Land Reform 
Act 5 of 2002 came into being 
to consolidate often unwritten 
customary law into statutory law 
based on constitutional principles 
and to improve overall communal 
land management. Communal land 
is generally argued to be vested in 
the state through article 100 and 
schedule 5 of the Constitution, 
which charges the state with 
administering communal lands 
in trust ‘for the benefit of the 
traditional communities residing on 
these lands’. 
However, government’s insistence 
that the state owns communal 
land is not universally accepted in 
communal areas or by some legal 
scholars (e.g. Harring 1996).  Con-
testations about ownership create 
legal difficulties in that acquiring 
commercial land for land reform is 
very expensive, but the state could 
potentially acquire communal land 
for nothing because it is already 
‘owned’ by the State. However, 
this might undermine delicate 
power relations between govern-
ment, communities and their tra-
ditional leaders as, unlike commer-
cial land owners, citizens  using 




The Communal Land Reform 
Act deals with communal land 
enclosures (and illegal fencing) 
in the context of traditional 
communities’ claims on land use in 
their traditional area, based on the 
customary law of their particular 
area. The communal land inhabited 
by members of particular traditional 
communities includes commonage 
— defined in the Communal Land 
Reform Act as: 
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 […] that portion of the 
communal area of a traditional 
community which is traditionally 
used for the common grazing of 
stock. 
Section 17 (1) of the Act provides 
that all communal land vests in the 
state in trust:
	 […]	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	 the	
traditional communities residing 
in those areas and for the purpose 
of promoting the economic 
and social development of the 
people of Namibia, in particular 
the landless and those with 
insufficient	 access	 to	 land	 who	
are not in formal employment 
or engaged in non-agricultural 
business activities. 
This section, in explicit terms, 
ensures that the landless and those 
with insufficient access receive the 
main benefit from communal land 
under the Act. This category of 
beneficiaries is distinguished from 
those in ‘formal employment or 
engaged in non-agricultural business 
activities’. However, benefits from 
communal land should accrue to 
informal sector practitioners who 
are actually intent on using and 
benefiting from agricultural land in 
communal areas. 
Section 17 (2) accordingly provides 
that no right conferring freehold 
ownership may be granted to any 
person in respect of communal land. 
The core principle is that individuals 
who wish to acquire large tracts of 
land for commercial farming should 
do so in commercial farming areas, 
not communal farming areas, based 
on the principle that communal land 
should provide a safety net for the 
poor and those who cannot find 
employment in the formal sector.
As indicated earlier, the lengthy 
negotiation process over the 
Communal Land Reform Act meant 
communal farmers and traditional 
authorities had no statutory law 
remedy to defend their rights, and 
powerful interest groups often made 
use of this policy and administrative 
void when they fenced off large 
tracts of communal land. The 
government has recognised illegal 
fencing as a pressing concern 
affecting the livelihoods of 
subsistence farmers (e.g. Former 
State President Sam Nujoma’s 
opening statement at the 1991 Land 
Reform Conference acknowledged 
that wealthy Namibians had 
embarked on illegally fencing-off 
communal lands; the Consensus of 
the Conference resolved to stop 
illegal fencing and take down 
all illegal fences; in 1990, then 
Minister of Lands, Resettlement and 
Rehabilitation Haufiku declared in a 
parliamentary debate ‘the fencing of 
communal land in communal areas 
is an activity which is continuing to 
endanger the important right of 
all people in those particular areas 
to have access to land.’). However, 
little has been done to address 
the issue, particularly since the 
Communal Land Reform Act was 
passed in 2002. 
The government has not adhered 
to its statement at the Consensus of 
the Land Reform Conference that it 
would
 […] undertake an urgent census 
of private enclosure to help 
enforce the moratorium and 
to determine the exact extent, 
nature and impact of private 
enclosure.
Instead, it seems that while 
government officials are not 
simply ignoring the issue, some 
are guilty of illegally fencing land 
for themselves. In 2000, Minister 
Iiluva-Ithana not only recognised 
the problem of illegal fencing, but 
accused other ministers of engaging 
in the practice:
 It is not the poor people who 
are fencing off the land. It is 
you [referring to ministers]! 
And you thought by playing 
all manoeuvres to delay the 
passing of the law, you will be 
forcing this Government to 
change communal land tenure 
to freehold – that is not going 
to be allowed.
Meanwhile, as then-Minister of 
Lands, Resettlement and Rehabilita-
tion Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana stated 
in 1996:
 Many traditional leaders 
have lost control over the 
administration of communal 
land. The power of traditional 
leaders has diminished over 
time and people do not longer 
seek their guidance. 
 The Association of Regional Councils 
Consultative Conference, Swakop-
mund, 19-21 September 1996
The declining role traditional 
leaders play in managing and 
allocating communal land has led 
to escalated illegal fencing since 
independence. A new elite were 
able to enclose communal-tenure 
rangeland for private use without 
any authorisation. However, there 
is some conjecture that traditional 
authorities condoned illegal fencing 
before the Communal Land Reform 
Act was in place so that they 
could earn income from allocating 
such land immediately because 
they speculated that such income 
September 2011 PolicyBrief
5
would dry up when a new Act was 
enacted (Blackie&Tarr 1998). The 
anticipated legislation increased the 
pace of communal land enclosure 
as enclosers reasoned that de facto 
private land ownership would be 
formalised at minimal cost under 
the new legislation, allowing them 
to obtain a formal title deed on any 
land they held (Fowler 1998). The 
land enclosures mean that powerful 
individuals have appropriated 
communal land for personal use 
at the expense of many communal 
farmers who do not have sufficient 
access to grazing land.
In Omusati Region a number of politically well-
connected individuals have fenced off large tracts 
of communal areas, claiming that they obtained 
authority to do so from the relevant Traditional 
Authority. In some cases, individuals applied to the 
relevant Communal Land Board for authorisation 
to retain fences on currently fenced-off land. These 
areas vary in size but in some cases are as large as 
10,000 ha. 
Over a year, the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) 
conducted several interviews with Uukwambi and 
Ongandjera Traditional Authorities, subsistence 
farmers affected by the illegal fencing and field staff 
working for the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement 
in Omusati Region. Subsistence farmers commonly 
complained of the negative effects of illegal fencing: 
diminishing grazing land in size and quality and 
preventing them from looking for lost animals in the 
fenced-in area. Diminished grazing land has resulted 
in weaker animals that develop at a slower rate and 
subsistence farmers incurring additional costs of 
buying fodder to supplement livestock diets. While 
subsistence farmers express much dissatisfaction with 
enclosures, most fear some form of retribution if they 
openly challenge the practice.  
In Omusati Region, poor law enforcement on 
illegal fencing immediately deprives most affected 
households of access to grazing, and in some cases of 
arable land, in effect, it also disinherits their children. 
New fences block the dry season routes by which 
herders take cattle to pasture in the southern parts of 
the Omusati Region and have negative socioeconomic 
and environmental implications. The practice is not 
only disrupting age old patterns of transhumance, 
confining seasonal grazing into ever smaller 
areas with the related danger of environmental 
degradation, but it also runs the risk of accelerating 
social differentiation in communal areas (Tapscott & 
Hangula 1994).
Rapid overgrazing of remaining open areas has 
already occurred, particularly in the corridors between 
enclosures. Where fences run for several kilometres 
on either side, it is often impossible for herds to 
survive the journey through these denuded corridors, 
so access to open grazing on the far side is also cut 
off. Fencing impacts on the poor, whose herds are 
shrinking in the face of deteriorating and declining 
communal grazing areas, while those able to fence 
can build larger and healthier herds.
In the absence of government action and support, 
Traditional Authorities argue they are powerless to 
prevent the illegal fencing, so community members 
have expressed anger towards them and no longer 
trust their ability to deal with other problems. One 
senior Uukwambi headman feels the Ministry of Lands 
and Resettlement is ‘sleeping’ and unhelpful. He says 
the Communal Land Reform Act should be enforced 
with as much power as the country’s other laws.
Another senior Uukwambi headman said many 
people enclosing land do not appreciate the illegality 
of it because no one has been prosecuted for illegal 
fencing yet. He knows of more than twenty cases of 
illegal fencing, but does not know what to do and no 
higher level central government authority is given on 
such matters. So new fences continue to be erected 
almost ‘on a daily basis’. He concluded: ‘There is so 
much of it happening that if the government doesn’t 
step in now, the problem will get harder to deal with.’




• Bring legal proceedings against 
persons who have fenced off 
large tracts of land however, this 
will require some organisation 
and co-ordination of farmers, 
since subsistence farmers 
affected by illegal fencing are 
uneasy about challenging the 
inadequate system and standing 
up to powerful elites responsible 
for enclosures. 
• Government must immediately 
take action against illegal fencers 
by formulating and publishing 
a policy on the issue and by 
using the most serious cases as 
test cases for adjudication. This 
would slow down infringement 
on the side of the fencers and 
it would have a preventative 
effect against future enclosures.
Conclusion
Once people see that illegal fencing 
will not be tolerated, it will have a 
preventative effect. For example, 
many of the subsistence farmers 
interviewed have bought their 
own fencing materials, but have 
not actually erected fences as they 
fear their fences will be removed. 
However, they also say they will 
not hold off indefinitely in putting 
up their own fences if nothing is 
done to address illegal fencing. If 
this happens, the face of communal 
areas in Namibia will change 
forever with potentially devastating 
consequences for the poorest of 
the poor who mostly rely on access 
to the commonage to sustain their 
livelihoods.
References
Adams F, Werner W and Vale P 
(1990) The Land Issue in Namibia: An 
Inquiry.  Namibia Institute for Social 
and Economic Research, University 
of Namibia: Windhoek, 94.
The Association of Regional 
Councils Consultative Conference, 
Swakopmund, 19-21 September 
1996.
Blackie R and Tarr P (1998) 
‘Government policies on sustainable 
development in Namibia’, Research 
Discussion Paper 27 Directorate of 
Environmental Affairs, Ministry 
of Environment and Tourism: 
Windhoek, 3.
Cox J, Kerven C, Werner W and 
Behnke R (1998) The Privatisation 
of Rangeland Resources in Namibia: 
Enclosure in Eastern Oshikoto. 
Overseas Development Institute: 
London, 39
Fowler M (1998) ‘The current 
status and impact of fencing in 
the Communal-tenure areas of 
Namibia,’ Agrekon, 37 (4): 442.
Hansard, 24 July–8 August 1990: 42.
Harring SL (1996) ‘The Constitution 
of Namibia and the Land Question: 
The Inconsistency of Schedule 5 and 
Article 100 as applied to communal 
lands with the rights and freedoms 
guaranteed communal land 
holders’, South African Journal on 
Human Rights 12: 467.
Mendelsohn J, el Obeid S, de Klerk N 
and Vigne P (2006) Farming Systems 
in Namibia. Namibia National 
Farmers Union: Windhoek, 46.
Mendelsohn J (2003) Atlas of 
Namibia: A Portrait of the Land and 
its People. David Philips Publishers: 
Cape Town, 134–137.
Namlex (2004) Index to the Laws of 
Namibia. Legal Assistance Centre: 
Windhoek.
Republiek van Suid-Afrika (1978) 
‘Verslag van Kommissie van 
Ondersoeknaaangeleenthede 
van Suidwes-Afrika’ in Tötemeyer 
G  Namibia Old and New: 
Traditional and Modern Leaders 
in Owamboland, C. Hurst & Co: ., 
London, 49–50.
Tapscott C and Hangula L (1994) 
‘Fencing of communal range 
land in northern Namibia: Social 
and ecological implications’, SSD 
Discussion Paper 6. Social Sciences 
Division, Multi-Disciplinary Research 
Centre, University of Namibia: 
Windhoek, 13.
United Nations Institute for Namibia 
(1988) Perspectives for National 
Reconstruction and Development. 
UNIN: Windhoek, 38.
financed	by
School of Government, University 
of the Western Cape, Private Bag 
X17, Bellville, 7535, Cape Town, 
South Africa




PLAAS engages in research, policy 
support, post-graduate teaching, 
training and advisory and evaluation 
services in relation to land and 
agrarian reform, community-based 
natural resource management and 
rural development.
PLAAS
Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies
School of Government • EMS Faculty
